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Abstract
This paper presents an argument against A D Smith’s Direct  Realist  theory of 
perception, which attempts to defend Direct Realism against the argument from 
illusion by appealing to conscious perceptual states that are structured by the 
perceptual constancies. Smith’s contention is that the immediate objects of perceptual 
awareness are characterised by these constancies, which removes any difficulty there 
may be in identifying them with the external, or normal, objects of awareness. It is 
here argued that Smith’s theory does not provide an adequate defence of Direct 
Realism because it does not adequately deal with the difficulties posed by the 
possibility of perceptual illusion. It is argued that there remain possible illusory 
experiences where the immediate objects of awareness, which in Smith’s account are 
those characterised by perceptual constancies, cannot be identified with the external 
objects of awareness, contrary to Direct Realism. A further argument is offered to 
extend this conclusion to all non-illusory  cases, by adapting an argument of Smith’s 
own for the generalising step of the Argument from Illusion. The result is that Smith’s 




In his recent book, The Problem of Perception, A. D. Smith has articulated a 
novel and interesting theory  of perception, which is a Direct Realist theory  and has, 
Smith believes, the resources to answer both the Argument from Illusion and the 
Argument from Hallucination. More recently, Smith has provided some clarifications 
of his theory  in response to a number of criticisms levelled against it  by Susanna 
Siegel (2006: 378-410). In particular, Siegel has argued that many of Smith’s claims 
about the nature of perceptual consciousness, claims which feature prominently in his 
answers to the arguments from illusion and from hallucination, are compatible with 
Indirect Realism. Smith responded to these criticisms in two ways: partly  by 
articulating his views more fully  and partly by arguing that  his own theory  of 
perception is not meant to show Indirect Realism to be false, but to show that Direct 
Realism can be true even in the face of the arguments from illusion and from 
hallucination. I find Smith’s responses to be generally  adequate to Siegel’s criticisms. 
In this paper, though, I argue against Smith’s theory on grounds distinct from those 
proposed by Siegel. I will argue that Smith’s theory  does not provide an adequate 
defence of Direct Realism because it  does not adequately deal with the difficulties 
posed by the possibility  of perceptual illusion. This is because, for all Smith says to 
the contrary, it still remains that in special kinds of illusory cases the immediate 
objects of sensory awareness, even when these are construed as the deliverances of 
perceptual constancies in the manner Smith requires, cannot be identified with the 
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ordinary, external objects of awareness. In short, Smith’s theory does not provide an 
adequate answer to the argument from the possibility of perceptual illusion. 
I begin my discussion in the next section with a brief exposition of Smith’s 
theory  and the way it is intended to provide a defence of Direct Realism in the face of 
the argument from illusion. In section 3 I argue that in certain special cases of illusion 
the sensory state must, even according to Smith’s general analysis of sensory  and 
perceptual states, be counted as an instance of indirect perceptual awareness. I then 
provide a further argument, a modification of one of Smith’s own, to show that if we 
treat the special cases as instances of indirect awareness we should also treat the 
normal cases in this way. The upshot of these arguments is that the possibility of 
perceptual illusion cannot be made compatible with Direct Realism simply by an 
appeal to the perceptual constancies, in the way advocated by Smith.
2. Smith’s Defence of Direct Realism
 Smith presents his theory of perception as a defence of Direct  Realism, in the 
face of the arguments from illusion and hallucination. Here ‘Direct Realism’ is to be 
understood as a kind of theory of perception which does not make a certain kind of 
existential commitment which is made by its realist alternative, Indirect Realism. 
Indirect Realism postulates, in addition to all the objects of awareness acknowledged 
by common sense and empirical discovery  (referred to by Smith as ‘normal’ objects 
of awareness), a distinctive category of object: those in virtue of which we enjoy 
sensory  awareness of the others. The Indirect Realist postulates two categories of 
objects of awareness and conceives of perceptual awareness as mediate; the Direct 
3
Realist, on the other hand, postulates only  one category of object of awareness and 
perceptual awareness is not construed as mediate in the way articulated by the Indirect 
Realist.
Our common sense view of perception is most naturally expressed as a variant 
of Direct Realism, because prior to serious reflection on perception we do not 
acknowledge a distinctive category of mediating objects of awareness. One 
motivation for making such an acknowledgment comes from reflection on the 
possibility of perceptual error: commonly, perceptual illusion or total hallucination. 
Each of these forms of perceptual error can be exploited to generate an argument in 
favour of Indirect Realism, known respectively as the argument from illusion and the 
argument from hallucination. The idea behind these arguments is that perception 
involves a conscious mental state, referred to as a sensation, which is characterised by 
a range of properties which do not merely specify the content of the state but are 
genuine properties of the vehicle of that content, such as colour, pitch, texture, etc. 
Smith gives these properties the label ‘sensory qualities’. Now, in cases of perceptual 
error there is no object characterised by  the relevant properties, either because there 
are no objects with these particular properties (illusion) or because there are no 
objects of the relevant kind whatever (hallucination). These are possible situations and 
these possibilities demand some explanation. As my  own objection to Smith’s theory 
concerns its capacity to deal adequately with perceptual illusion, in what follows I 
will focus on the argument from illusion.
The Indirect Realist has available an explanation of perceptual illusion: in 
such situations there are mediating objects of awareness characterised by  these 
properties. Moreover, these mediating objects are identified with sensations: they just 
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are mental states characterised by sensory  properties. As Smith conceives it, the 
argument from illusion poses the following challenge to someone wishing to defend a 
Direct Realist theory  of perception: sensations, defined as above, must be 
acknowledged in the theory, but without these mental states being construed as 
objects of awareness. Given the sheer possibility  of perceptual illusion and the 
thought that any  account of cases of illusion must apply equally to non-illusory cases, 
failure to do so will result in the conclusion that sensations are not just occasionally 
objects of awareness but always immediate objects of awareness. This will just  be to 
concede the argument to the Indirect Realist, who holds that in perception we are 
aware of external, or what Smith calls ‘normal’, objects always only  in virtue of an 
awareness of some other object which we are aware of immediately. 
The Direct Realist must offer an explanation at  least as plausible, but 
preferably better, than the Indirect Realist’s. Smith argues at length that various forms 
of Direct Realism which divide perceptual states into a conceptual mental state and a 
non-conceptual sensation fail to provide a plausible construal of sensations that does 
not make them objects of awareness.1  Moreover, Smith argues that simply rejecting 
the act/object analysis of perception, which the sense-datum theorists of the early 20th 
century appealed to in their arguments for Indirect Realism, will be insufficient to 
meet the challenge presented by the argument from illusion: 
“For even if sensory qualities are inherent qualities of sense-
experience itself, it is far from clear how we can avoid the conclusion 
that we are aware of them as objects whenever we are perceptually 
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1 See Smith (2002): chapter 3
conscious, or that we immediately aware of the experience itself that 
exhibits such qualities. On such a view perceptual experience would 
be self-presenting, and the upshot of the Argument would be that we 
are only ever aware of our own experiences, with such experiences 
themselves constituting the veil of perception.... Perception is 
sensuous in a way that mere thought is not because it involves 
perceptual sensation. Our problem is, therefore, to see how such 
sensations can fail to be our immediate objects of awareness whenever 
we perceive.”
Smith (2002: 60-61)
Smith’s own theory of perception aims to address this problem: it 
acknowledges sensations, in the sense specified earlier: conscious mental states 
characterised by sensible qualities, which do not merely specify the content of the 
state but  are genuine properties of the vehicle of that content. However, in Smith’s 
theory  sensations are not construed as objects of awareness at all. To see why Smith 
thinks he can claim this we need to introduce two other states of mind that Smith’s 
theory postulates2: 
1. Phenomenally perceptual conscious states
2. Perceptions
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2 This distinction is articulated in Smith (2006): 420-421
‘Phenomenally  perceptual conscious states’ are states in which sensations are 
structured in a distinctive manner: the phenomenal character of these experiences is 
structured by at least one of three non-sensory features:
i. Phenomenal three-dimensionality
ii. Kinetic structure or position constancy
iii. The Anstoss, or a non-sensory awareness of one’s own agency
‘Perceptions’, on the other hand, are states where these features do not actually 
structure the phenomenal character of the experience, but  the perceptual systems of 
the subject are such that movement would result in ‘phenomenally  perceptual 
conscious states’. ‘Mere’ sensations are states where movement would not result in 
such phenomenally perceptual conscious states, such as in the case of after-images.
 Now, the reason that Smith’s theory can offer a response to the argument from 
illusion is because, on his account, objects of awareness only begin to enter the story 
when we consider phenomenally perceptual conscious states. The proper specification 
of the properties possessed by the objects of perceptual awareness are, Smith claims, 
to be found by considering the non-sensory features distinctive of these phenomenally 
perceptual conscious states. A correct list of the properties possessed by  the objects of 
awareness is not to be found by considering the sensory qualities that ‘mere’ 
sensations possess, or are ‘characterized by’: these latter properties are not, according 
to Smith, properties of the object of awareness at all. For Smith, what counts as the 
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immediate object of awareness is ‘characterized’ by these non-sensory features, which 
he calls ‘phenomenological constancies.’3 
“Such constancy is not the function of any “judgment” that 
supplements the deliverances of the sense; it characterizes what we are 
aware of in the most “basic” and “immediate” sense.”
Smith (2002: 178)
Smith’s idea seems to be that, whatever the immediate object of awareness turns out 
to be, the actual or potential operation of the constancies mean that the object of 
immediate awareness will possess the properties of being spatially related to my sense 
organs, being in one unchanging position as I move around it, or as resisting the 
imposition of my agency in specific ways as I push against it. None of this is true of 
‘mere’ sensation, so sensations are not, on this account, to be construed as objects of 
awareness, contrary to Indirect Realism. 
Smith argues that  the many philosophers who have been tempted by  Indirect 
Realism have gone wrong in two places: firstly, in thinking that the immediate objects 
of awareness should be construed as being characterised by any old sensible qualities 
which a sensation is characterised by, such as the increase in extensity that is a feature 
of objects getting closer.4  Secondly, they have gone wrong in failing to recognise that 
Smith’s non-sensory features are just as much ‘original’ features of perceptual 
phenomenology than are those changes in extensity just mentioned. The difficulties 
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3 Smith (2002: 170-171)
4 Although, Smith does not deny that this is a feature of the phenomenal character of these states. For 
Smith’s discussion see (2002: 165-87).
for Direct Realism in providing an adequate response to the argument from illusion if 
these views are adopted would be ‘overwhelming’, as Smith believes. The only 
reason Smith can see for adopting these views, however, arises in the visual case and 
amounts to the claim that visual experience is not phenomenally three-dimensional in 
character. Smith thinks that there is ‘nothing whatever’ to be said in favour of this5, so 
we have no reason to adopt these views that would present overwhelming difficulties 
for Direct Realism.
 In response to Smith’s account of phenomenally perceptual conscious states 
and the significance of the constancies for the argument from illusion, Siegel has 
observed that, although there is much to be said in its favour, nothing said by Smith 
rules out postulating mediate objects of awareness which possess these constancy 
features. This is to say that nothing Smith has to say  rules out Indirect Realism. At 
this point Smith could have availed himself of an argument he gives briefly at the 
outset of The Problem of Perception, that Indirect Realism fails not simply because it 
offers a poor account of perceptual illusion, but because it is incoherent:
The point about Indirect Realism is not that it  is epistemologically 
suspect, but that it is incoherent…. We need, first, to be clear precisely 
what it is that this position invites us to be Realists about. The domain 
in question is that of the physical components of the empirical world. 
An empirical world is an environment of which we are cognizant 
through perception – one that contains entities we can and do 
perceive…. Any  hypothesized realm of concrete, non-conscious 
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5 A claim he argues for independently in Smith (2000).
elements… with which we could have no perceptual dealings whatever, 
which contained no entity that we could possibly  perceive would not be 
our physical world…. A realm is empirical, is our world, only  in virtue 
of elements in it being perceptible; but for the Indirect Realist this can 
only be a matter of indirect perception. So this realm is supposed to be 
both empirical and yet i rremediably  behind a “veil of 
perception” (Smith 2002: 13-14)
This brief argument is, I think, not particularly compelling because it  tacitly supposes 
that the possibility of perception which makes an empirical world our world must be 
the possibility of unmediated perception, which is not obviously  plausible. However, 
the central thrust of Smith’s attempt to defend Direct Realism does not rely on the 
success of this argument. Smith does not intend this argument against Indirect 
Realism to conclusively demonstrate the truth of Direct Realism, because Smith 
considers Idealism to be a legitimate alternative, competing explanation of the facts 
about perception.6  Moreover, the response Smith gives to Siegel’s criticism does not 
appeal to this argument. The reply  he offers to Siegel has two features: first, where 
Siegel suggests that various versions of the sense-datum theory can incorporate the 
constancy features Smith appeals to, Smith offers a series of detailed objections. 
Secondly, Smith observes that even if there were a version of Indirect Realism that 
could do so, this would be irrelevant to the limited, 'essentiality defensive task' of 
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6 In this respect Smith is engaging the work of John Foster, who argues that Indirect Realism offers the 
best realist account of the facts of perception, but is unstable: for Foster, Idealism offers a better 
account. See Foster (2003)
defending Direct Realism from the challenge raised by the possibilities of illusion and 
hallucination:
"...all I need to do is to give a plausible account of a way in which 
sensations can fail to be objects of awareness: to offer an unrefuted 
and at least equally plausible alternative account to the sense-datum 
theory." (Smith 2006: 414)
Smith's theory is precisely  intended to offer such an alternative. So, even 
though everything Smith says about the constancies may be consistent with Indirect 
Realism, this does not impugn his central claim that the Argument from Illusion 
provides no good grounds for the falsity of Direct Realism.
Though Smith restricts himself to this limited defensive task, there would 
remain a further step  required for someone who wishes to defend Direct Realism. 
Recall that  Smith considers the Argument from Illusion to present an explanatory 
challenge: to explain how there can be illusory perceptions involving sensations 
which possess sensory properties. In the absence of a cogent Direct  Realist response 
to this challenge Smith argues we should favour the ontologically more profligate, but 
explanatorily more satisfactory  Indirect Realist account. In the scenario envisaged by 
Siegel, however, the Indirect  Realist co-opts those parts of Smith’s Direct Realist 
account that are intended to render it explanatorily satisfactory. However, when we 
have equally satisfactory explanations, as in such a scenario, we must turn to other 
considerations to 'break the tie'. There are, though, at least  two that are available here: 
we could observe that Direct Realism is to be preferred to Indirect Realism either 
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because it is closer to our pre-theoretical thinking about perception, or that it is 
ontologically more economical. 
3. The Possibility of Illusion
 Having outlined the way that Smith’s theory  attempts to defend Direct 
Realism, I will now proceed to argue that the theory, ingenious though its strategy is 
for blocking some of the traditional considerations in favour of Indirect Realism, is 
nonetheless unsuccessful. This is because the reason given in the argument from 
illusion for not identifying the external, or what Smith calls the ‘normal’, objects of 
awareness with the immediate objects of awareness, construed as sensations, applies 
equally to any  attempt to identify the normal, external object of awareness with 
Smith’s own proposed objects of immediate awareness, i.e. those introduced as being 
‘characterised’ by  the perceptual constancies. The reason given to block the 
identification in the case of sensations by the argument from illusion was simply the 
possibility of perceptual illusion.
 To see why there is a difficulty here for Smith, let us grant his proposal that in 
phenomenally perceptual conscious states which register objects in sensation7 
whatever is to be characterised as the immediate object of awareness is characterised 
by the phenomenal constancies. The question that naturally  arises is whether such 
objects can have properties different from the normal, external objects of awareness. 
If this is possible then, by Leibniz’s Law, they cannot be identical and Direct Realism 
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7 Smith calls perceptual states of this kind 'sensuously presentational', to be distinguished from possible 
perceptual states that present objects by means of the Anstoss but which do not involve sensations, as 
in the case of pushing against a wall when your arm is anaesthetised. 
is false. If, on the other hand, Smith’s proposed immediate objects of awareness 
cannot have properties different from the normal objects then his version of Direct 
Realism will be defensible. The problem facing Smith’s defence of Direct Realism is 
that a good case can be made in favour of the following metaphysical possibility: a 
situation where the objects characterised by the constancies do not have the same 
properties as the normal, external object of awareness. My argument is different from 
Siegel’s in the following important respect: it does not turn on the (legitimate) 
observation that sense-data could be three-dimensional and characterised by the 
constancies. Instead the idea is that we grant Smith the hypothesis that whatever is the 
object we are immediately aware of in perception is characterised by the constancies 
and then show that this object is one which can have properties other than the normal, 
external object of awareness.
 Before I present the argument, I need to be clear that my objection is not the 
same as one that Smith has already made provision for in his theory: the recognition 
that it is possible for the constancies to fail. As a matter of fact, such constancies can 
and do fail us and some scenarios can be envisaged where they do not even feature in 
the phenomenal character of our sense experience. It  is to account for this that Smith 
introduced a distinction between ‘perceptions’ and ‘phenomenally  perceptual 
conscious states’. A sense experience counts as the latter if it is actually characterised 
by the constancies; it counts as the former if it is not, but  if upon movement the 
perceptual systems of the creature would give rise to a phenomenally perceptual 
conscious state. In the case of ‘perceptions’ the characterisation of the immediate 
object of awareness is still given by the constancies which would feature in 
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experience, were the subject to move. This provides an elegant  solution to the 
difficulty posed by possible failures in the operation of the constancies.8
 However, my argument does not appeal to the possibility of failure of the 
operation of the constancies, but instead appeals to the possibility  of a creature with a 
sensory  field that is phenomenally three-dimensional and characterised by perceptual 
constancies, but which is systematically non-veridical. The kind of case I have in 
mind can be illustrated by thinking about a kind of experience that humans can have. I 
suffer from astigmatism in one eye; when I first began wearing corrective glasses for 
this my visual experiences of movement at  the edges of my visual field, outside the 
area covered by my corrective glasses, was extremely  disorientating. As I walked 
along, objects appearing to move toward me at a regular speed would appear to 
suddenly leap closer to me as they passed across the boundary set by the rim of my 
glasses. Although the effects of astigmatism were disorientating, the effects were 
sufficiently minor that it was no impediment to navigating my  locomotion. It is not 
important to the example, though, that there be variability in the sensory  qualities of 
such an experience as the objects appear to move; what is important  is that any 
attempt on my part to reach out and catch such objects would systematically result in 
error. The errors in this kind of case arise from precisely the non-sensory constancy 
features that are home ground for Smith’s theory. These kinds of abrupt shifts in 
apparent position were the result of putting on spectacles, but there is no reason to 
suppose that there could not be a creature whose experiences were like this as a result 
of the normal operation of the perceptual systems that underwrite the constancy 
features of its sensory experience. Moreover, there is no reason to suppose that there 
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8 This distinction between perceptions and phenomenally perceptual conscious states is developed in 
Smith’s (2007) reply to Siegel’s (2006) critical discussion. For a further articulation, see (Smith 2011).
could not be such a creature for who these shifts and discontinuities were quite 
uniform across its sense fields.
 For further illustration, consider what it  is like to watch an old, juddery, black-
and-white film of a train approaching. The train appears generally  to approach at a 
constant speed along a single, straight  path. However, the judder of the film can result 
in noticeable shifts in the apparent position and speed of the train as it approaches: 
sometimes it appears to move slightly faster, sometimes slightly slower; sometimes it 
seems to jump to the left, sometimes to the right. This concerns the phenomenal 
character of a perceptual experience, but of course our visual system can recover a 
general path and speed for the train – we experience the film as showing a general 
progression of the train toward us. Now, this recovery can be more or less precise: the 
case I have in mind is one where this recovery is imprecise. The case I have in mind is 
of a creature with perceptual systems that underwrite its visual modality whose 
normal operation results in a sensuously presentational perceptual state where the 
constancy structured experience is rather like ours when we watch a juddery, black 
and white film. However, the constancy features of the experience are sufficiently 
imprecise that most of the creature’s attempts to reach for objects on the basis of this 
awareness result in failure. For such a creature, when objects appear to approach it 
they  are characterised by fairly variable deformations in apparent size, shape and 
discontinuous shifts in position (where such deformations, though variable, are not 
extreme). Such a creature could certainly  get around in the world, albeit  with a fair 
amount of luck.
Now consider a case where such a creature has such an experience as it 
perceives the approach of an object, where the normal, external object of awareness 
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undergoes no such deformations and shifts in position. For a creature such as I have 
described, the objects characterised by the perceptual constancies will then not be 
identifiable with the normal, external objects of awareness, by Leibniz’s Law. 
Moreover, in this case Smith will not be able to appeal to his distinction between 
perception and phenomenally perceptual conscious states in the way he does with 
actual failures of constancy  in human beings. This is because for human beings the 
perceptual systems underwriting our sense experience would, upon movement, result 
in objects whose characterisation in terms of the constancies would (according to 
Smith) not preclude identification. In the case of the creature I have described, this is 
just not the case – movement by such a creature would still result  in immediate 
objects of awareness whose characterisation in terms of the constancies differs from 
the properties possessed by the normal, external object of awareness. For such 
creatures, then, Smith’s appeal to constancies will be insufficient to meet the 
challenge raised by the argument from illusion. Such creatures would be creatures for 
who Indirect Realism would be true.
In this regard, my criticism is different from that made by  Georges Dicker in 
his review of Smith’s book. Dicker’s criticism focuses on the possibility that in the 
ordinary  course of our experiences which are characterised by constancies, those 
constancies might fail: ‘But he must allow, as seems true anyway, that on occasion 
constancy fails for shape and size…. How then are we to avoid commitment to sense-
data based on cases where the appeal to constancy fails?’ (Dicker, 2006: 426) Smith’s 
response to this question is just that given above: although in such cases constancy 
fails, there are possible movements that would result in experiences where the 
constancies are restored. In the cases where the constancies fail we enjoy  either mere 
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sensation, in which case according to Smith there is no object of perceptual 
awareness, or we enjoy a perception, where the object of awareness is characterised 
by those constancies that have, in this instance, failed.
Dicker’s objection concentrates on the case of a creature whose experience is 
normally characterised by  constancies and when these constancies are operative there 
is no discrepancy between their characterisation of the immediate object of awareness 
and the properties characterising the ‘normal’, external object of awareness. The case 
of constancy failure Dickers seems to have in mind is a situation where such a 
creature has an experience, resulting from the failure of these constancies, where there 
is a discrepancy between the sensory properties characterised by  the experience and 
the properties of the normal object of awareness. This situation is one to which, as I 
have said, Smith has a response. There is, however, a more problematic case for 
Smith: this is the case of a creature which has experiences that are normally 
characterised by constancies, but such that when these constancies are operative there 
are systematic and regular discrepancies between the sensory properties possessed by 
the experience and the properties of the normal object of awareness. Where this case 
is distinct from that Dicker has in mind is that these discrepancies arise precisely 
when the constancies for that creature are in normal operation for that creature. 
 If my argument is correct then it  turns out that Smith has overlooked the 
importance for his defense of Direct Realism of the fact that the deliverances of the 
constancies are veridical, in the following sense: that in their normal operation there 
must be no divergence between the properties such as size, shape and location 
possessed by the immediate objects of awareness they characterise and those 
properties possessed by the external, ‘normal’ objects of awareness. That there must 
17
be no divergence in properties is simply a consequence of Leibniz’s Law: Smith 
appears to have overlooked that Leibinz’s Law applies also to those properties 
possessed by the immediate object of awareness, as characterised by  the constancies. 
The following claim from Smith is an instance where this oversight  has led him into 
error: ‘The perceptual constancies are, indeed, far from perfect; but even if they were 
worse than they  actually are, that would be of no significance.’(Smith, 2002: 179) 
Smith is mistaken here: how good the constancies are is of paramount importance to 
his claim that we have no reason to suppose that the objects of awareness they 
characterise can be identified with the ‘normal’, external objects without violating 
Leibniz’s Law.
My argument also highlights the following important feature of Smith’s 
theory: whether or not a creature’s perceptual experiences are classified as instances 
of direct awareness or not depends upon the veridicality  (in the sense given above) of 
the constancy features of its phenomenology. It is clear that this is not what Smith 
intends: after all, as mentioned above, Smith thinks that Indirect Realism is not just 
contingently false, but incoherent. Nor should a philosophical theory  of perception 
have this as a consequence, as I shall argue shortly. But, the possibility of the creature 
I have described shows that whether experiences possessing these constancy features 
are veridical or not is, according to Smith’s theory, an entirely  contingent matter. 
Consequently, according to Smith’s theory, whether a creature’s perceptual experience 
is an instance of direct awareness or not must be a contingent matter of fact. 
This contingency would be avoided if we could argue that the constancy 
features of Smith’s phenomenally  perceptual conscious states somehow guarantee 
veridicality  in the relevant respects (i.e. the location of the object, the character of its 
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movement through space, or its felt resistance to the imposition of the subject’s 
agency). As I have said, this is in fact  what is required by Smith’s defense of Direct 
Realism in the face of the explanatory challenge raised by the argument from illusion. 
One line of argument that could be pursued to provide support for this claim would be 
to argue that the kind of creature we have been considering does not and moreover 
cannot have experiences characterised by  perceptual constancies, despite all my 
claims to the contrary. A reason for arguing this way may be found in the description I 
gave of there being ‘variable deformations in size and shape’ and ‘shifts in position’. 
It may  be argued that perceptual constancies do not  and cannot result in such 
variability: constancies do just what they say on the tin and result in constant, 
unchanging sizes, shapes and locations. On this account, constancies will guarantee 
veridicality. The problem with this argument is that it simply  begs the question. It is 
not obvious that it is a conceptual truth that perceptual constancies cannot result  in the 
limited variability I have described: if it  is not a conceptual truth then it looks like just 
a re-articulation of the claim that states exhibiting such constancy features 
(phenomenally perceptual conscious states) guarantee veridicality. However, this was 
the very claim that wanted motivating. 
Given that we have no reason to suppose that the constancy  features of 
Smith’s phenomenally perceptual conscious states guarantee veridicality, we also 
have no reason to deny  that such a creature as I have described is possible. It follows 
that whether a creature’s perceptual experience is an instance of direct awareness or 
not is a contingent matter of fact. This result is critical, because the purpose of 
philosophical theorising about perception is not to give an account of what perception 
consists in for a particular organism, contingently arranged in a particular way, but to 
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give an account in very general terms of what perception is for anything that may 
exhibit it. It  is only by antecedently having such an account that we can legitimately 
class different organisms as perceiving. Direct Realism and Indirect Realism are 
accounts of perception at this level of generality, but  if Smith’s analysis is correct and 
my argument here is correct, then these alternatives should not be rival accounts of 
the nature of perception, but instead alternative ways in which perception can be 
manifested. Given that they are rival accounts, either my argument is incorrect  or 
Smith’s analysis is incorrect as a general account of the nature of perception.
There is a philosophical view of perception that does, in one special case, deny 
that there can be a unified account of perception that applies both to those cases that 
are caused by the external objects they represent  and to those cases that are not so 
caused. This is disjunctivism: the view that two subjectively indiscriminable 
perceptual states, where one is a hallucination and the other is not, are not instances of 
a common kind. Smith might try to make a similar move here and say that the 
experiences of the creature I have described should be categorised as a case of 
hallucination, where they are aware of an unreal object. Such a move would be 
entirely  ad hoc, though: in the case of visual discontinuities and abrupt jumps in 
position, the problem is not that there is no physical object seen, but that that physical 
object is seen to be where it is not. The perceptual experiences of the creature I have 
described are not hallucinations, they are illusions.
4. The ‘not creatures like us’ objection
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The most likely observation in response to my counterexample to Smith’s 
theory  is that the creature I have been describing is not like us, so there is no reason to 
suppose that any conclusions drawn in its case can be extended to our own. This 
objection gets traction when we observe that we have no reason to believe that  the 
specific features of the imagined creature that prevent the identification of immediate 
object with normal, or external, object of awareness obtain in our case. This leaves it 
open to Smith to accept, though I doubt he would wish to, that Direct Realism is true 
of the creatures I have been describing but that still there is no good reason to suppose 
that it is true of us.9  I call this the ‘not creatures like us’ objection.
There is a response to this objection that is available through a modification of 
one of Smith’s own arguments. This is an argument Smith offers to motivate 
acceptance of that part of the argument from illusion he calls the ‘generalising step’. 
This step  requires us to apply the account of perception we give of illusory cases to 
non-illusory  cases. Smith argues that this step is mandatory in view of the 
unacceptability of holding a Direct Realist account of non-illusory cases and an 
Indirect Realist account of illusory cases. He argues that such a position radically 
misconceives perception insofar as it  construes us as only rarely directly aware of the 
normal, external objects of awareness and that non-normal objects of awareness pop 
into and out of our consciousness all the time. Given how radically such a view 
departs from our understanding of perception, we should reject it and apply the same 
analysis to both illusory and non-illusory cases.
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9 The reason Smith is unlikely to pursue this option is that he thinks Indirect Realism is incoherent, so 
it could not be true of any being; for more, see Smith (2002): 15-17. 
To deny  the generalising step  is to suppose that  as you walk out of the 
shop  while looking at your purchase, you only  become directly aware 
of that physical item as you emerge into daylight (assuming this is 
when an object shows its true colours). Only then does that physical 
object suddenly  leap  into your perception in propria persona. (Smith 
2002: 27)
For my  purposes, the crucial point that needs to be made concerning this 
argument is that it would retain all its force for a creature that contingently never 
actually suffered a case of perceptual illusion, but which could. So, this argument 
would apply  with equal force in the case of a human being who was kept from birth in 
an environment with constant and uniform lighting conditions and so never enjoyed 
the relevant changes in experience that arise in changes of lighting conditions.
How then can we make use of this argument against Smith’s theory? The first 
step is to observe that the introduction of a possible creature with non-veridical 
phenomenally perceptual conscious states was really a vivid way of describing a state 
that it is a metaphysical possibility for us to be in. Given suitable gradual 
modifications of a human’s visual system, one could gradually  come to enjoy the 
kinds of non-veridical experiences characteristic of the creatures described above. The 
non-veridical constancies that normally characterise that creature’s perceptual 
experience would become normal for me. As someone gradually modifies my visual 
system, I will be in a situation similar to the person Smith describes above: i.e. 
enjoying a series of smoothly connected sensory experiences as he emerges in to the 
daylight. If that is correct, as it  seems to be, then Smith’s argument for the 
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generalising step applies here: the same analysis of my post-modification states 
should apply to my pre-modification states. As argued above, we cannot apply  the 
Direct Realist account to the non-veridical cases; so we must apply the Indirect 
Realist account to the veridical cases. The same general account of perception must be 
given for both: the Indirect Realist account. We can conclude, then, that within the 
framework of Smith’s analysis of perception and illusion Direct Realism should be 
rejected. Consequently, Smith’s defence of Direct Realism on the basis of the 
phenomenological constancies, despite its importance as a discussion of relevant 
phenomenological features of perceptual states, is not successful.
5. Conclusion
The foregoing argument should not be confused with one that establishes the 
falsity of Direct Realism or the truth of Indirect Realism. It is less ambitious than that: 
if correct it establishes that even if we accept Smith’s analysis of perception then we 
still have good reason to reject Direct Realism. Given the importance of Smith’s 
theory, this point is of some significance by  itself, but there is a further, wider ranging 
consequence of the failure of Smith’s defence. The failure calls into question the 
emphasis that  Smith places on providing an analysis of perception according to which 
sensations do not feature as objects of awareness in any way for responding 
adequately to the challenge posed by the possibility  of illusion. Smith is quite right 
that it is incumbent upon a theory  of perception to provide such an analysis, if it 
purports to be a Direct Realist theory and also acknowledges sensations as the bearers 
of sensory qualities. However, the more serious challenge to the Direct Realist, 
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highlighted by the preceding argument, is to show that whatever is introduced as the 
object of direct awareness can have no metaphysical possibility  of instantiating 
properties other than those instantiated by the external object of awareness. This is a 
much harder challenge to meet and, as I have shown above, Smith’s analysis of 
perception cannot provide such a demonstration. Moreover, adverting to the difficulty 
of meeting this challenge is at least one more way in which the Indirect Realist can 
shore up support for his own position.
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